


# Preparing for Takeoff

Launching a Transparent Process for Canadian Military Procurement

Interdepartmental Working Group on CF-18 Replacement:

McKenzie Kibler, Derrick Lepine, Paul Thompson, Greg Whitelaw February 18, 2017



#### **Policy Problem**

Canada's procurement process has failed to deliver a replacement for our aging CF-18 fleet



Process <



Product X



# **Evaluation Criteria** (Stakeholder Groups)

#### Transparency (Canadian Public)

Military Capabilities (DND) Cost Effectiveness (PSPC) Benefit to Industry
(ISEDC)

Timeline (All Stakeholders)



- 1) Background
- 2) Three policy options
- 3) Recommendation and rationale
- 4) Highlights of our recommended option
- 5) Implementation plan
- 6) Assessment and Mitigation of Risk
- 7) Communications Strategy

# **Background: Government Commitment**

#### **Canada's Commitments**

Joint Strike Fighter Program

- 1997 present
- Sunk cost: CAD\$448M

Canada First Strategy, 2008

• CAD\$240B over 20 years

#### Flawed F-35 Process

Inconsistent costing figures

Siloed decision-making

**Public Opinion Poll** 

Nanos: 97% of Canadians want transparency

#### Nov. 22, 2016 Announcement

Sole source 18 Super Hornets

CAD\$1.43B

Fair & Open Process for future procurement



## **Background: Cost of Not Acting**

Canada's CF-18 Fleet is Aging and needs replacement

- Extended lifetime
- Sovereignty concerns

#### Loss of public trust

JSF biased to F-35

Canada's current procurement process not working



# Option 1: Sole-source F-35 (Status Quo)

Proceed with the JSF program; immediately negotiate and sign a contract for the purchase of 65 F-35 fighter jets.

- → Acquisition cost CAD\$9.89B
- → CAD\$152.2M/unit
- → CAD\$45.8B lifecycle over 42 years

Criteria	Analysis		
Transparency	Low public confidence		
Military Capability	DND recommended		
Cost Effectiveness	No competitive bidding		
Industry Benefit	Maintain existing contracts		
Timeline	Immediate decision		



# **Option 2: Staggered Procurement**

Immediately procure 18 Super Hornets to fill capability gap; create an open competition schedule, half of the fleet replaced every 21 years.

- → Acquisition cost CAD\$1.43B
- → CAD\$79.6M/unit
- → Nov. 22, 2016, announcement

Criteria	Analysis
Transparency	Open bidding
Military Capability	Mixed fleet
Cost Effectiveness	No economies of scale
Industry Benefit	Smaller offsets
Timeline	Delayed decision making



## **Option 3: Open and Transparent Procurement Process**

Create a new Department to oversee an open bidding using clear measures for cost-effectiveness and performance.

- → "Defence Procurement Canada"
- → Request for Proposal using \$ per flight hour, including life-cycle maintenance cost
- → Negotiate competing contracts

Criteria	Analysis		
Transparency	Open, comparable bidding		
Military Capability	DND Input Balanced		
Cost Effectiveness	More complete costing		
Industry Benefit	Possible JSF Withdrawal		
Timeline	Procurement in 24 months		



#### Recommendation

We recommend **Option 3**: Open and Transparent Procurement Process

#### **Rationale**

Only policy option that delivers an open and transparent process while balancing military capability, cost effectiveness, and industry considerations

### **Creating a New Department**

Status Quo: Multi Departmental Model

Centralized, streamlined Defence Procurement Model

Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada

(Aerospace, Defence, and Marine Branch)

Public Services and Procurement Canada

(Defence and Marine Procurements Branch)

Department of National Defence (ADM Materiel)



- Independent Department
- Ministerial Responsibility
- Single point of accountability
- Streamlined process
- Performance Measures
- Specialized knowledge
- <u>Legacy</u>: Canada First capital modernization (CAD\$240B) to 2028



# Request For Proposal (RFP) Process

- Based on 491,400 flight hours (planned yearly flying rate \* service life)
- Includes all acquisition and maintenance costs
- Punitive measures for delays

#### Military

- Payload
- Range
- Sensors

#### Cost

- Acquisition
- Sustainment
- Operation

#### Industry

- Offset investments
- Job creation
- Origin of supplies



#### Implementation Plan

#### Statement of Intent, Creation of DPC

Release full statement to public RE: new transparent procurement process.

3 APR, 2017

#### **RFP Process Begins**

RFP sent to five major manufacturers

1 SEPT, 2017

#### **Bidding Period Ends**

Manufacturers send sealed, unique bid. DPC Begins Evaluations of Bids

1 FEB, 2018



#### **Final Decision by Cabinet**

Cabinet decides on which contract to sign. Costs decision in Budget 2019.

15 FEB, 2019

#### **Contracts Finalized**

DPC, Treasury Board, PCO, finalize contracts with two manufacturers, and make their recommendation to cabinet

1 DEC, 2018

#### **DPC Recommendation**

DPC shortlists two aircraft; approved by cabinet; PCO, TB, and DPC to negotiate competing contracts

1 MAY, 2018



# **Policy Considerations**

- Is implementation feasible?
  - Yes Precedent for completing project on specified timeline, new department
- Balancing military capabilities, cost effectiveness, industry benefits
- Transparency of RFP (via \$/flight hour) balanced with protection of proprietary information
- Creation of DPC for future military procurement

# **Assessment and Mitigation of Risks**

Risk Category	Assessed Risks (Initial Risk Level)	Mitigation Strategy (Mitigated Risk Level)
Budgetary	<ul><li>Cost overruns/"gold plating"</li><li>High lifecycle cost</li><li>Collusion/Cartel behavior in RFP</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Off-the-shelf purchasing</li> <li>Maintenance costs included in RFP, contract</li> <li>Game Theory: No chance for collusion</li> </ul>
Political	<ul><li>Perceived lack of transparency</li><li>Media/lobby group pressure</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Publish \$ per flight hour for all bidders as a standard, transparent measure of value</li> </ul>
International	<ul><li>Strategic integration with allies</li><li>International industry lobby</li></ul>	<ul><li>Strategic considerations in RFP</li><li>Some risk regardless of decision</li></ul>
Procedural	<ul><li>Creation of new ministry</li><li>Length of RFP process</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Organized from existing bureaucracy</li> <li>Precedent for &lt; 30 months</li> </ul>
Economic	Loss of industrial contracts	High opportunity cost of aerospace investment



# **Communications Strategy - Key Messages**


	Internal	External	
Military Capability	One line of accountability, uniform goals	Streamlined delivery of military equipment	
Cost Effectiveness	Process will drive down costs as firms compete for the contract	Popular support for fair, open competition	
Industrial Benefit	Low ROI (\$0.82 per \$1 spent)	Industrial offsets create jobs, but the Government is purchasing a plane based on capabilities	



#### Conclusion

#### Focusing on the <u>Process</u>

- Single department
- Open, detailed RFP
- Comparable cost figure




#### Delivers the Product


- Capable aircraft
- Cost effective
- Timely and transparent



# Appendix A: Canadian Fighter Jet Service Hours



Appendix B: DND F-35 Costing (2012)
Source: Department of National Defence






# Appendix C: Input-Output Multipliers

INDUSTRY	OUTPUT (per \$1.00)	GDP (per \$1.00)	WAGES (per \$1.00)	JOBS CREATED (per \$1 million)
Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing	\$1.74	\$0.82	\$0.50	7.14
All Industries	\$2.00	\$1.09	\$0.60	10.65
Defence Services	\$2.06	\$1.24	\$0.83	12.76
Other Federal Government Services (Except Defence)	\$2.05	\$1.25	\$0.86	11.76
Provincial and Territorial Government Services	\$2.29	\$1.16	\$0.74	11.58
Ship and Boat Building	\$2.08	\$0.97	\$0.69	12.27

Source: Statistics Canada, 15F0046X


# Appendix D: Preferences on New jet Fighters selection process New jet fighters selection process

Source: Nanos Research, RDD dual frame hybrid telephone and online random survey, June 24th to 26th, 2016, n=1,000, accurate 3.1 percentage points plus or minus, 19 times out of 20.



Source: http://www.nanosresearch.com/sites/default/files/POLNAT-S15-T689.pdf, page 11

# Appendix E: Preferences on Acquiring new fighter jets Acquiring new fighter jets



Source: <a href="http://www.nanosresearch.com/sites/default/files/POLNAT-S15-T689.pdf">http://www.nanosresearch.com/sites/default/files/POLNAT-S15-T689.pdf</a>, page 5

# Appendix F: Defence Procurement Canada Structure

